Secondly, it is in keeping with the use of this sacrament, that Christ's body be shown apart to the faithful as food, and the blood as drink. But the intellectual soul is one form. If, on the contrary, we suppose one instrument and several principal agents, we might say that there are several agents, but one act; for example, if there be many drawing a ship by means of a rope; there will be many drawing, but one pull. Reply to Objection 1. Therefore we must suppose dimensions in matter before the substantial forms, which are many belonging to one species. Because the change of the bread and wine is not terminated at the Godhead or the soul of Christ, it follows as a consequence that the Godhead or the soul of Christ is in this sacrament not by the power of the sacrament, but from real concomitance. Further, all the powers of the soul are rooted in the essence of the soul. viii (Did. Therefore some other substantial form in the body precedes the soul. It follows, therefore, that it is altogether impossible and unreasonable to maintain that there exists one intellect for all men. Objection 1. For the nature of each thing is shown by its operation. As it is in this sacrament, can Christ's body be seen by the eye? Thus are all other consecrations irremovable so long as the consecrated things endure; on which account they are not repeated. For an immaterial substance is not multiplied in number within one species. For it is not an accidental form, but the substantial form of the body. Now everything that moves itself is divided into two parts, of which one moves, and the other is moved, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. A spiritual substance which is united to a body as its motor only, is united thereto by power or virtue. Objection 4. On the contrary, It is said in the book De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus xv: "Nor do we say that there are two souls in one man, as James and other Syrians write; one, animal, by which the body is animated, and which is mingled with the blood; the other, spiritual, which obeys the reason; but we say that it is one and the same soul in man, that both gives life to the body by being united to it, and orders itself by its own reasoning. Does the true body of Christ remain in this sacrament when He is seen under the appearance of a child or of flesh. Therefore it seems that the soul is united to the body by means of a power, which is an accident. But virtue or power cannot be more abstract or more simple than the essence from which the faculty or power is derived. Therefore, if there were one intellect for all men, the diversity of phantasms which are in this one and that one would not cause a diversity of intellectual operation in this man and that man. Secondly, because a glorified body, which appears at will, disappears when it wills after the apparition; thus it is related (Luke 24:31) that our Lord "vanished out of sight" of the disciples. And (De Anima ii, 3) he compares the various souls to the species of figures, one of which contains another; as a pentagon contains and exceeds a tetragon. But each part of the human body is not an organic body. Reply to Objection 3. The manner of being of every thing is determined by what belongs to it of itself, and not according to what is coupled accidentally with it: thus an object is present to the sight, according as it is white, and not according as it is sweet, although the same object may be both white and sweet; hence sweetness is in the sight after the manner of whiteness, and not after that of sweetness. For this sacrament is ordained for the salvation of the faithful, not by virtue of the species, but by virtue of what is contained under the species, because the species were there even before the consecration, from which comes the power of this sacrament. As stated above (Article 4), the accidents of Christ's body are in this sacrament by real concomitance. But the intellectual action is not the action of a body, as appears from above (I:75:2). Now it happens that different things, according to different forms, are likened to the same thing. And so the substance of Christ's body or blood is under this sacrament by the power of the sacrament, but not the dimensions of Christ's body or blood. It seems, then, that straightway on the morrow, or after a short time, He ceases to be under this sacrament. Reply to Objection 2. In the body, the form of which is an intellectual principle, is there some other soul? But the substantial form gives substantial being. Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae: A Guide and Commentary Brian Davies, Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae: A Guide and Commentary, Oxford University Press, 2014, 454pp., $29.99 (pbk), ISBN 9780199380633. And, as was said already, this is not deception, because it is done "to represent the truth," namely, to show by this miraculous apparition that Christ's body and blood are truly in this sacrament. The way in which Christ is in this sacrament Is the whole Christ under this sacrament? Likewise it is evident that it is not in this sacrament circumscriptively, because it is not there according to the commensuration of its own quantity, as stated above. 1 First Part. Two dimensive quantities cannot naturally be in the same subject at the same time, so that each be there according to the proper manner of dimensive quantity. Further, since the form is the principle of the species, one form cannot produce a variety of species. But there is this difference, according to the opinion of Aristotle, between the sense and the intelligencethat a thing is perceived by the sense according to the disposition which it has outside the soul that is, in its individuality; whereas the nature of the thing understood is indeed outside the soul, but the mode according to which it exists outside the soul is not the mode according to which it is understood. For the relation of phantasms to the intellect is like the relation of colors to the sense of sight, as he says De Anima iii, 5,7. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Hence since it is seen in its proper species, and is adored in heaven, it is not seen under its proper species in this sacrament. But this could not be so, if Christ were entire under every part of the species; for every part would have to be under every other part, and so where one part would be, there another part would be. Hence it is clear that the body of Christ is in this sacrament "by way of substance," and not by way of quantity. Now it is clear that common nature becomes distinct and multiplied by reason of the individuating principles which come from the matter. For although sensibility does not give incorruptibility, yet it cannot deprive intellectuality of its incorruptibility. Mai 2 in groer Auswahl Vergleichen Angebote und Preise Online kaufen bei eBay Kostenlose Lieferung fr viele Artikel! Reply to Objection 2. We must not consider the diversity of natural things as proceeding from the various logical notions or intentions, which flow from our manner of understanding, because reason can apprehend one and the same thing in various ways. Thus through the intelligible species the possible intellect is linked to the body of this or that particular man. I answer that, The eye is of two kinds, namely, the bodily eye properly so-called, and the intellectual eye, so-called by similitude. Now it is evident that He is not there under the sacramental species, which is that of bread or wine. Translated by. Therefore Christ's body is in this sacrament locally. Therefore the intellectual principle is the form of man. Reply to Objection 1. Therefore if the intellect were united to the body as its form, since every body has a determinate nature, it would follow that the intellect has a determinate nature; and thus, it would not be capable of knowing all things, as is clear from what has been said (I:75:2; which is contrary to the nature of the intellect. As stated above, the body of Christ is not under the species of wine by the power of the sacrament, but by real concomitance: and therefore by the consecration of the wine the body of Christ is not there of itself, but concomitantly. Now it is clear that no matter how the intellect is united or coupled to this or that man, the intellect has the precedence of all the other things which appertain to man; for the sensitive powers obey the intellect, and are at its service. As stated above, during such apparitions Christ's proper semblance is not seen, but a species miraculously formed either in the eyes of the beholders, or in the sacramental dimensions themselves, as was said above. Reply to Objection 3. But the dimensive quantity of Christ's body is considerably larger than the dimensive quantity of the consecrated host according to every dimension. Reply to Objection 1. Further, the Philosopher says, Metaph. But since the soul is united to the body as its form, it must necessarily be in the whole body, and in each part thereof. Objection 5. Further, Christ's body begins to be in this sacrament by consecration and conversion, as was said above (III:75:2-4). Consequently, the dimensive quantity of Christ's body is not there. It seems that Christ is not entire under every part of the species of bread and wine. The same is to be said of totality of power: since the whiteness which is in the whole surface moves the sight more than the whiteness which is in a small part thereof. ii, 2), the ultimate natural form to which the consideration of the natural philosopher is directed is indeed separate; yet it exists in matter. Further, whatever exists in a thing by reason of its nature exists in it always. But dispositions to a form are accidents. Reply to Objection 2. Reply to Objection 3. And therefore had this sacrament been celebrated during those three days when He was dead, the soul of Christ would not have been there, neither by the power of the sacrament, nor from real concomitance. This argument is based on the nature of a body, arising from dimensive quantity. Therefore by the coming of the accidental form a thing is not said to be made or generated simply, but to be made such, or to be in some particular condition; and in like manner, when an accidental form is removed, a thing is said to be corrupted, not simply, but relatively. x). ii) that "when our pretense is referred to some significance, it is not a lie, but a figure of the truth." The Summa Theologica is divided into three parts. And first we should consider the natureof human beings [QQ75-89], then second But it was said above (Reply to Objection 2) that Christ's body is compared with this sacrament not by reason of dimensive quantity, but by reason of its substance, as already stated. I answer that, It is absolutely impossible for one intellect to belong to all men. Therefore Christ's body is not in this sacrament as in a place. Objection 2. For this reason the human soul retains its own existence after the dissolution of the body; whereas it is not so with other forms. I answer that, We must assert that the intellect which is the principle of intellectual operation is the form of the human body. Therefore the species of things would be received individually into my intellect, and also into yours: which is contrary to the nature of the intellect which knows universals. That it is entire in each part thereof, may be concluded from this, that since a whole is that which is divided into parts, there are three kinds of totality, corresponding to three kinds of division. Reply to Objection 3. x, 7) that the ultimate happiness of man must consist in this operation as properly belonging to him. If, however, there is one principal agent, and one instrument, we say that there is one agent and one action, as when the smith strikes with one hammer, there is one striker and one stroke. Those things which are derived from various forms are predicated of one another, either accidentally, (if the forms are not ordered to one another, as when we say that something white is sweet), or essentially, in the second manner of essential predication, (if the forms are ordered one to another, the subject belonging to the definition of the predicate; as a surface is presupposed to color; so that if we say that a body with a surface is colored, we have the second manner of essential predication.) Therefore the whole soul is not in each part. God, however, provided in this case by applying a remedy against death in the gift of grace. And this is apparent from the form of this sacrament, wherein it is not said: "This is My flesh," but "This is My body." But inasmuch as the soul is the form of the body, it has not an existence apart from the existence of the body, but by its own existence is united to the body immediately. I answer that, As we have said, if the soul were united to the body merely as its motor, we might say that it is not in each part of the body, but only in one part through which it would move the others. I answer that, Since the form is not for the matter, but rather the matter for the form, we must gather from the form the reason why the matter is such as it is; and not conversely. The soul communicates that existence in which it subsists to the corporeal matter, out of which and the intellectual soul there results unity of existence; so that the existence of the whole composite is also the existence of the soul. Reply to Objection 1. It seems that the soul is united to the animal body by means of a body. Objection 2. Now an animal is so called from its having a sensitive soul; and, therefore, "animal" will not be one genus common to man and other animals, which is absurd. Nevertheless the substance of Christ's body is not the subject of those dimensions, as was the substance of the bread: and therefore the substance of the bread was there locally by reason of its dimensions, because it was compared with that place through the medium of its own dimensions; but the substance of Christ's body is compared with that place through the medium of foreign dimensions, so that, on the contrary, the proper dimensions of Christ's body are compared with that place through the medium of substance; which is contrary to the notion of a located body. But Christ's eye beholds Himself as He is in this sacrament. This can be made clear by three different reasons. For nothing is absolutely one except by one form, by which a thing has existence: because a thing has from the same source both existence and unity; and therefore things which are denominated by various forms are not absolutely one; as, for instance, "a white man." I answer that, Such apparition comes about in two ways, when occasionally in this sacrament flesh, or blood, or a child, is seen. The intellectual soul as comprehending universals, has a power extending to the infinite; therefore it cannot be limited by nature to certain fixed natural notions, or even to certain fixed means whether of defence or of clothing, as is the case with other animals, the souls of which are endowed with knowledge and power in regard to fixed particular things. Reply to Objection 3. It is true that it moves the grosser parts of the body by the more subtle parts. Reply to Objection 1. Now the intellectual soul, as we have seen above (I:55:2) in the order of nature, holds the lowest place among intellectual substances; inasmuch as it is not naturally gifted with the knowledge of truth, as the angels are; but has to gather knowledge from individual things by way of the senses, as Dionysius says (Div. But it is clear that the action of the visual power is not attributed to a wall in virtue of the fact that the colors whose likenesses are in the visual power exist in that wall. But it is the act of an organic body. Objection 1. There remains, therefore, no other explanation than that given by Aristotlenamely, that this particular man understands, because the intellectual principle is his form. But the body has a substantial form by which it is a body. On the other hand, His soul was truly separated from His body, as stated above (III:50:5). Wherefore, after the consecration, the whole substance of Christ's body and blood is contained in this sacrament, just as the whole substance of the bread and wine was contained there before the consecration. Reply to Objection 5. Therefore a form cannot be without its own proper matter. But the intellectual principle has per se existence and is subsistent, as was said above (I:75:2). Reply to Objection 1. Further, the Philosopher says (De Gener. Therefore, for the same reason, every other glorified eye can see Him. For it would follow that Socrates and Plato are one man; and that they are not distinct from each other, except by something outside the essence of each. For that whereby primarily anything acts is a form of the thing to which the act is to be attributed: for instance, that whereby a body is primarily healed is health, and that whereby the soul knows primarily is knowledge; hence health is a form of the body, and knowledge is a form of the soul. However, it would be possible to distinguish my intellectual action form yours by the distinction of the phantasmsthat is to say, were there one phantasm of a stone in me, and another in youif the phantasm itself, as it is one thing in me and another in you, were a form of the possible intellect; since the same agent according to divers forms produces divers actions; as, according to divers forms of things with regard to the same eye, there are divers visions. Therefore also the soul is thus united to the body. The First Part addresses God, gradually working its way through God's creation and the angels to man. Some of the powers of the soul are in it according as it exceeds the entire capacity of the body, namely the intellect and the will; whence these powers are not said to be in any part of the body. Font. Further, power and action have the same subject; for the same subject is what can, and does, act. The divine beatitude (26) THE BLESSED TRINITY ORIGIN: The question of origin or procession (27). 3 - OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES) Question. Edus. Objection 3. But the species of anything is derived from its form. But the organ of touch requires to be a medium between contraries, such as hot and cold, wet and dry, and the like, of which the sense of touch has the perception; thus it is in potentiality with regard to contraries, and is able to perceive them. For this reason Aristotle, Metaph. The place in which Christ's body is, is not empty; nor yet is it properly filled with the substance of Christ's body, which is not there locally, as stated above; but it is filled with the sacramental species, which have to fill the place either because of the nature of dimensions, or at least miraculously, as they also subsist miraculously after the fashion of substance. The distinction between Socrates and Plato would be no other than that of one man with a tunic and another with a cloak; which is quite absurd. Objection 2. Further, Christ is in this sacrament, forasmuch as it is ordained to the refection of the faithful, which consists in food and drink, as stated above (III:74:1). Objection 1. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. Whence it does not follow that a part of an animal is an animal. Further, what is spiritual is connected with what is corporeal by virtual contact. Reply to Objection 1. It seems that Christ's body is not truly there when flesh or a child appears miraculously in this sacrament. Is the entire Christ under each species of the sacrament? 77: The Powers of the Soul in General: Q. The soul is the act of an organic body, as of its primary and proportionate perfectible. Hence it is clear that Christ, strictly speaking is immovably in this sacrament. Objection 4. If, however, the intellectual soul is united to the body as the substantial form, as we have already said above (Article 1), it is impossible for any accidental disposition to come between the body and the soul, or between any substantial form whatever and its matter. The reason of this is that a thing is one, according as it is a being. Therefore, according to the division of matter, there are many souls of one species; while it is quite impossible for many angels to be of one species. Therefore of necessity by the same form a thing is animal and man; otherwise man would not really be the thing which is an animal, so that animal can be essentially predicated of man. Nor does it matter, as to this particular point, whether there be one intellect or many; because, even if there were but one, it would necessarily be an individual intellect, and the species whereby it understands, an individual species. The human soul, by reason of its perfection, is not a form merged in matter, or entirely embraced by matter. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. "The human mind may perceive truth only through thinking, as is clear from Augustine." - Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica Summa Theologica is an extensive five-volume masterpiece about the. Objection 2. But the angels see the body of Christ as it is in this sacrament, for even the devils are found to pay reverence thereto, and to fear it. Augustine denies a plurality of souls, that would involve a plurality of species. But it is evident that the bread and wine cannot be changed either into the Godhead or into the soul of Christ. Is it united to such a body by means of another body? But the measure of the bread and wine is much smaller than the measure of Christ's body. One knowledge exists in the disciple and another in the master. Therefore if it be asked whether the whole whiteness is in the whole surface and in each part thereof, it is necessary to distinguish. Moreover it is perceived differently by different intellects. Hence it remains that Christ's body is not in this sacrament as in a place, but after the manner of substance, that is to say, in that way in which substance is contained by dimensions; because the substance of Christ's body succeeds the substance of bread in this sacrament: hence as the substance of bread was not locally under its dimensions, but after the manner of substance, so neither is the substance of Christ's body. Are all the dimensions of Christ's body in this sacrament? Further, the soul is in the body of which it is the act. Objection 3. Therefore the breath, which is a subtle body, is the means of union between soul and body. Acknowledgement: This digital file was produced through the kindness of Sandra K. Perry, Perrysburg, Ohio. vi, 1). Therefore since, as we have said, the intellectual soul contains virtually what belongs to the sensitive soul, and something more, reason can consider separately what belongs to the power of the sensitive soul, as something imperfect and material. But the intellectual soul is incorruptible; whereas the other souls, as the sensitive and the nutritive, are corruptible, as was shown above (I:75:6). Objection 6. It would seem that besides the intellectual soul there are in man other souls essentially different from one another, such as the sensitive soul and the nutritive soul. vii, 6). And therefore it is manifest that the entire Christ is under every part of the species of the bread, even while the host remains entire, and not merely when it is broken, as some say, giving the example of an image which appears in a mirror, which appears as one in the unbroken mirror, whereas when the mirror is broken, there is an image in each part of the broken mirror: for the comparison is not perfect, because the multiplying of such images results in the broken mirror on account of the various reflections in the various parts of the mirror; but here there is only one consecration, whereby Christ's body is in this sacrament. Reply to Objection 5. This can easily be explained, if we consider the differences of species and forms. Objection 3. vii, 3), compares the species of things to numbers, which differ in species by the addition or subtraction of unity. Since, then, the substance of Christ's body is present on the altar by the power of this sacrament, while its dimensive quantity is there concomitantly and as it were accidentally, therefore the dimensive quantity of Christ's body is in this sacrament, not according to its proper manner (namely, that the whole is in the whole, and the individual parts in individual parts), but after the manner of substance, whose nature is for the whole to be in the whole, and the whole in every part. Perhaps someone might attempt to answer this by saying that before sin the human body was incorruptible. Reply to Objection 2. ii, 1) that the relation of a part of the soul to a part of the body, such as the sight to the pupil of the eye, is the same as the relation of the soul to the whole body of an animal. For Augustine says (De Qq. But no dimensive quantity is contained entirely in any whole, and in its every part. But if it is a form by virtue of some part of itself, then that part which is the form we call the soul, and that of which it is the form we call the "primary animate," as was said above (I:75:5). Objection 3. In like manner the multiplicity of souls is in proportion to the multiplicity of the bodies; yet, after the dissolution of the bodies, the souls retain their multiplied being. If, however, the soul is united to the body as its form, as we have said (Article 1), it is impossible for it to be united by means of another body. For corruptible and incorruptible are not of the same substance. Objection 5. Further, as stated above (Article 4), the body of Christ is in this sacrament with its dimensive quantity, and with all its accidents. Augustine speaks there of the soul as it moves the body; whence he uses the word "administration." Objection 3. Reply to Objection 5. Therefore Christ's body is not truly there. However, St. Aquinas provides five ways that prove that God exists and the world belongs to him. But the shape is united to the wax without a body intervening. Reviewed by Christopher Martin, Center for Thomistic Studies, University of St. Thomas (TX) 2015.04.21 Now whatever is received into anything must be received according to the condition of the receiver. Questions 75-89 of the First Part (Prima pars) of St. Thomas's great Summa theologiae constitute what has been traditionally called "The Treatise on Man," or, as Pasnau prefers, "The Treatise on Human Nature." Pasnau discusses these fifteen questions in the twelve chapters, plus Introduction and Epilogue, that make up his book. But Christ's body has already begun to be in this sacrament by the consecration of the bread. But the soul is the substantial form of man. How it is caused will be shown later on (I:117:1). Further, Augustine (De Quant. Wherefore the unity of a thing composed of matter and form, is by virtue of the form itself, which by reason of its very nature is united to matter as its act.
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